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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Loren Curry appeals from his conviction for burglary, aggravated
assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm with a persistent violator
enhancement.

On appeal, Curry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his burglary and aggravated assault convictions. He also contends
that the district court erred in failing to give the jury his requested self-defense
instruction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Melissa Ferra told police that her boyfriend, Curry, may have wrecked and
abandoned her car. (Tr., p.69, Ls.19-20; p.70, L.10 - p.72, L.11.) The next night
Ms. Ferra stayed at the house of Marlisa Gordon.

(Tr., p.72, Ls.12-15; p.58,

Ls.4-17). The next morning, they awoke to find the word "snitch" written in black
marker on Ms. Gordon's front door and oil on her vehicle. (Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.60,
L.8.) Curry admitted to his brother he had written the word "snitch" on the door
and poured oil on the car. (Tr., p.133, L.25 - p.134, L.24.)
After Curry's and Ms. Ferra's breakup and just a couple of days after the
vandalism,1 Ms. Gordon's boyfriend, Travis Escudero, answered a phone call
from a person he believed to be Curry stating he was "coming for [him]." (Tr.,
p.37, L.2 - p.39, L.14.) Around 35 minutes later, Curry arrived at Ms. Gordon's
residence where she and Mr. Escudero were in the open garage, sitting on a

The jury was instructed in Curry's trial they could use the admission of
vandalism only as motive evidence. (Tr., p.135, Ls.3-11.)
1

1

couch located next to the door leading into the house, having a cigarette. (Tr.,
p.41, L.2 - p.42, L.13.) Curry walked up to the pair inside the garage, kicked
over a coffee table and yelled and screamed at them. (Tr., p.42, L.15 - p.44,
L.12.) Curry had a bag of clothing in one hand and kept his other hand in his
pocket. (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-24.)
While yelling and screaming at Mr. Escudero, Curry "made a gesture" with
his hand and Mr. Escudero "saw a black piece of something" that he believed to
be a pistol. (Tr., p.42, L.24 - p.43, L.1.) Mr. Escudero was frightened based on
his belief that Curry had a gun and sent Ms. Gordon in to call the police while
grabbing a one and one-half to two foot metal pole to protect himself. (Tr., p.43,
Ls.1-11.) Curry responded by asking Mr. Escudero if he "want[ed] to go," which
Mr. Escudero perceived as a threat of the use of a gun against himself because
"what could you have in your pocket that would stop a pole?" (Tr., p.43, Ls.1217.) Curry continued to yell, then turned around and walked away while giving
Mr. Escudero "the finger." (Tr., p.46, Ls.12-22.)
When Curry's brother arrived home after work the same evening Curry
threatened Mr. Escudero, he heard Curry on the telephone making reference to
a gun to the person on the other end of the line. (Tr., p.135, L.20 - p.138, L.21.)
A search warrant was ultimately served on Curry's mother's home, where Curry
resided, and a loaded black pistol was eventually recovered from a box in a
closet in the mother's room. (Tr., p.163, L.18 - p.164, L.14.)
The state charged Curry with burglary, aggravated assault, felon in
possession of a firearm, and malicious injury to property as against Ms. Gordon,
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with a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp.11 0-112.)
Curry entered a written plea of guilty to the malicious injury to property charge.
(R., pp.107-109.) The trial court limited the state's case in chief to evidence of

the burglary and aggravated assault charge and ruled that, if the jury returned
verdicts of guilty, it would be provided with evidence on the charge of felon in
possession of a firearm and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(Tr., p.14, L.1 - p.21, L.11.)
Following presentation of the state's case, Curry made a Rule 29 motion
for a judgment of acquittal asserting "no reasonable juror on the state of this
evidence could return a verdict of guilt in regard to [Curry]." (Tr., p.198, L.22 p.199, L.1.) The trial court denied the motion, finding:
[T]here is evidence sufficient in this record by which a reasonable
juror would infer that Mr. Curry entered the garage intending to
intimidate Melissa Ferra in that there was evidence that she lived at
that house, was at that house frequently, that the word "snitch" was
written on that door in reference to her at that house, and the oily
substance poured over the car at that house where she lived. So a
reasonable jury could infer that his reason for entering that garage
was to intimidate a person who he believed may be a witness in a
criminal proceeding in that he believed that she had, in the
vernacular, "snitched him off to the police about the car wreck
incident."
There's evidence by which the Jury could also reasonably
infer that he intended to commit aggravated assault on the
occupants, at least Mr. Escudero, of that garage by the fact of the
evidence that he kept his hand in his pocket, which had the black
metallic object, at all times during the few minutes of confrontation.
That he had his hand in his pocket as he walked in. He kept his
hand in that pocket. And then as things began escalating, he
pulled that object out. The Jury could infer that he intended to
commit an assault with a deadly weapon or a firearm based on that
evidence. They could infer that.
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The Jury could also infer that that [sic] object in his pocket
was a handgun. They may not find that. They may find that. It
would be a reasonable inference under all of the circumstances of
this record for them to make that decision that the State has proved
that this was a handgun with which Mr. Curry committed the other
elements of assault.
(Tr., p.205, L.24 - p.207, L.3.) The defense rested without presenting evidence.
(Tr., p.213, Ls.11-15.) The jury returned a verdict finding Curry guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of burglary and aggravated assault.

(R, p.206; Tr., p.220,

Ls.8-24.) Curry admitted the bases for the persistent violator enhancement and
agreed to waive his right to a jury determination of the felon in possession of a
firearm charge at which time the trial court found him guilty based on the jury's
prior finding of three of the four elements of the offense in addition to his status
as a felon by his own admission. (Tr., p.229, L.18 - p.238, L.10.)
Curry again moved the trial court for a judgment of acquittal or in the
alternative a new trial asserting "that the evidence adduced by the State was
insufficient to cause a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
(R, p.208; Tr., p.241, L.18 - p.242, L.1.)

The court denied Curry's motion,

finding the verdict was not contrary to the law or evidence:
Again, I'm not going to reiterate all the findings that I have
previously made in previously denying the Rule 29 motions for
judgment of acquittal, incorporate those rulings and findings and
conclusions in finding that this verdict was not contrary to the
evidence.
It is not contrary to the law as well, and the motion for new
trial will be denied. It is not contrary to the law because, if the Jury
[sic] has evidence by which they can find that the State has proved,
by the applicable burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that
all of the elements of aggravated assault and all of the elements of
burglary have been proved by the State, then there was no law
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application that this verdict would be contrary to law based upon
that evidence.
Now, the contrary law argument that the defense makes puts forward here is that the Court just simply allowed too much
impeachment evidence of witness Melissa Ferra's testimony, and
this - but the defense does not cite any standard by which what is
too much evidence, what is too much impeachment evidence, what
is evidence by which a jury can not [sic] follow the Court's
instructions and apply the limited admissibility rules that the Court
instructed the Jury on many times.
(Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.253, LA.) The court sentenced Curry to concurrent unified
sentences of 13 years with the first four years fixed for the burglary conviction,
15 years with the first five years fixed on the aggravated assault, and 13 years
with four fixed for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

(Tr., p.277, L.9 -

p.278, L.2; R., pp.223-226.) Curry timely appeals. (R., pp.230-233.)
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ISSUES
Curry states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions?

2.

Was a self-defense instruction improperly denied?

3.

Was the new trial motion improperly denied?

(Appellant's brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was there substantial, competent evidence presented at trial from which
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Curry was guilty of burglary
and aggravated assault?

2.

Has Curry failed to show the district court committed instructional error by
concluding Curry was not entitled to a self-defense instruction at his trial
for aggravated assault?

3.

Has Curry failed to carry his appellate burden of showing error in the
denial of his motion for a new trial?

6

ARGUMENT
I.

There Was Substantial, Competent Evidence Presented At Trial To Support The
Jury Verdict Finding Curry Guilty Of Burglary And Aggravated Assault

A.

Introduction
Curry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his burglary

and aggravated assault convictions.

Specifically, he contends that the state

failed to prove Curry's intent when entering the garage rose to the level
necessary to support a burglary conviction.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.) He

asserts as to the aggravated assault conviction that "the state failed to present
sufficient evidence that a deadly weapon was present." (Appellant's brief, p.15.)
Curry's arguments are without merit. A review of the record and the applicable
law shows that the state presented substantial, competent evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Curry entered the garage with the necessary
intent to commit a burglary and that a deadly weapon was used in the
commission of his assault on his victim Mr. Escudero.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
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the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are

construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
698,701,946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735
P .2d at 1072.

C.

The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence That Curry
Entered The Garage With The Intent To Commit a Felony
Count I of the second amended information charged Curry with burglary in

violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-1401 and 19-2514. (R., p.110.)

For Curry to be

guilty of that offense, he had to enter Ms. Gordon's residence "with the intent to
commit the crime of witness intimidation and/or aggravated assault." (See Jury
Instruction No. 12, R., p.188.)

See also I.C. § 18-1401 (intent required for

burglary is "intent to commit a felony"). Contrary to Curry's assertions on appeal,
a review of the record and the applicable law shows that the state carried its
burden.
Curry asserts on appeal the state failed to prove Curry entered the garage
at Ms. Gordon's residence with either the intent to commit witness intimidation or
aggravated assault.

(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

The district court correctly

concluded there was sufficient evidence by which a reasonable juror could infer
that Curry entered the garage "intending to intimidate Melissa Ferra." (Tr., p.205,
L.23 - p.206, L.1 0.)
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The state presented evidence that Ms. Ferra stayed overnight at Ms.
Gordon's house and spent a considerable amount of time there (See Tr., p.56,
L.4 - p.57, L.19 (testimony of Ms. Gordon regarding Ms. Ferra's visitation
habits); Tr., p.70, LS.3-9 (testimony of Ms. Ferra as to her frequent stays at Ms.
Gordon's house)), and that Curry believed Ms. Ferra had "snitched" on him to the
police and had once taken action to show his displeasure with her for doing so
(see Tr., p.133, L.22 - p.135, L.11 (testimony of Curry's brother regarding
Curry's admissions to him that he had committed the vandalism at Ms. Gordon's
house and the trial court's instruction to the jury that such information could be
considered as possible motive evidence).)

The state presented substantial

evidence upon which the jury could conclude Curry entered the garage on the
date in question with the intent to find Ms. Ferra and confront her about informing
the police of her suspicions that he had taken and wrecked her car.
Curry further asserts the state failed to prove he entered the garage with
the intent to commit aggravated assault. (Appellant's brief, p.14.)

Specifically,

Curry argues "the state did not prove the presence of a gun." (Appellant's brief,
p.14.) The district court correctly found a jury could reasonably infer that Curry
entered the garage with the intent to commit aggravated assault on the
occupants:
There's evidence by which the Jury could also reasonably
infer that he intended to commit aggravated assault on the
occupants, at least Mr. Escudero, of that garage by the fact of the
evidence that he kept his hand in his pocket, which had the black
metallic object, at all times during the few minutes of confrontation.
That he had his hand in his pocket as he walked in. He kept his
hand in that pocket. And then as things began escalating, he
pulled that object out. The Jury could infer that he intended to
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commit an assault with a deadly weapon or a firearm based on that
evidence. They could infer that.
The Jury could also infer that that [sic] object in his pocket
was a handgun. They may not find that. They may find that. It
would be a reasonable inference under all of the circumstances of
this record for them to make that decision that the State has proved
that this was a handgun with which Mr. Curry committed the other
elements of assault.
(Tr., p.206, L.11 - p.207, L.3.)
The state presented evidence that Mr. Escudero believed at the time
Curry entered the garage he had a gun in his pocket.

(See Tr., p.42, L.11 -

p.46, L.17 (testimony of Mr. Escudero regarding Curry's demeanor, actions, and
his own observation of an item consistent with a gun in Curry's pocket).) This
evidence is coupled with the threatening phone call (Tr., p.37, L.2 - p.39, L.14),
Curry's own statements overheard by his brother the night of the assault relating
to a gun (Tr., p.136, L.1 - p.137, L.S), and the subsequent retrieval of a black
handgun with dark brown grips from the home in which Curry resided (Tr., p.164,
Ls.4-12).

Curry likens the current situation to an allegation of assault based

strictly on a bulge in the pocket coupled with a threatening gesture. (Appellant's
brief, p.15.) That is simply not what the evidence against Curry showed. Mr.
Escudero, an individual trained as a sniper with war time experience, testified
Jhat Curry's actions and demeanor taken with the metal object consistent with a
gun sticking out of his picket led him to believe at the time that Curry had a
weapon; it did not occur to Mr. Escudero at the time that it could be anything
other than a gun in Curry's pocket. (Tr., p.33, L.25 - p.34, L.25; p.45, Ls.15-24.)
The state presented substantial evidence upon which the jury could conclude
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Curry entered the garage on the date in question with the intent to commit an
aggravated assault upon the inhabitants with the weapon concealed in his
pocket.

D.

The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence That Curry
Committed An Assault With A Deadly Weapon
Count II of the second amended information charged Curry with

aggravated assault in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-901, 18-905, and 19-2514.
(R., p.110.)

For Curry to be found guilty of that offense, he needed to have

committed an assault upon Travis Escudero "with a deadly weapon," alleged to
have been a handgun. (See Jury Instructions No. 17, 18, R., pp.193-194.) See
also I.C. § 18-905(a) (defining aggravated assault as assault with a deadly
weapon or instrument). Contrary to Curry's assertion on appeal that "the state
failed to present sufficient evidence that a deadly weapon was present"
(Appellant's brief, p.15), a review of the record and the applicable law shows
that the state carried its burden.
Curry again asserts "the state failed to present sufficient evidence that a
deadly weapon was present." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) As discussed above, the
state presented sUbstantial evidence upon which a jury could conclude Curry
had a weapon when he assaulted Mr. Escudero.

The district court correctly

determined, when reviewing the evidence and reasonable inferences from that
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party that "[t]he jury could
infer that that [sic] object in [Curry's] pocket was a handgun .... It would be a
reasonable inference under all of the circumstances of this record for them to
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make that decision that the State has proved this was a handgun.

" (Tr.,

p.206, L.22 - p.207, L.2.)

II.
Curry Has Failed To Show There Was Instructional Error As A Result Of The
Trial Court Declining To Give A Self-Defense Instruction

A.

Introduction
Curry complains the trial court erred in declining his request for a self-

defense instruction because, he contends, the "denial was based on an
erroneous understanding of the law and is reversible error." (Appellant's brief,
p.17.) Curry is not entitled to relief because he has failed to demonstrate he was
entitled to such an instruction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844
P.2d 691, 694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261,265,16 P.3d 937,941 (Ct.
App. 2000). A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous
,

statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible
comment on the evidence or is adequately covered by other instructions. State
v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,881,736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State v. Turner, 136
Idaho 629,632-33,38 P.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Camp, 134
Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether a reasonable view of
the evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court's discretion.
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State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State v. Howley, 128
Idaho 874,878,920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996).

C.

Curry Was Not Entitled To A Self-Defense Instruction
Curry claims the trial court erred in denying his request for a self-defense

instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-21.) Curry's claim fails because he failed to
meet his burden of establishing such an instruction was supported by the
evidence.
A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction which is not
supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881,736 P.2d 1327,
1335 (1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct.
App. 1986) (self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). To be entitled
to an instruction on an affirmative defense, a defendant must "present facts
sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the] defense." State v.
Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000). In order to
prevail on his claim that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction, Curry must
demonstrate from the record "evidence of reasonable fear of some level of bodily
harm," State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999),
and that the assault he committed was a reasonable response to the level of
threat posed by the victim, State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 670, 726 P.2d 772,
782 (Ct. App. 1986). A review of the record shows that the district court properly
rejected the requested self-defense instruction because there was no evidence
whatsoever that there was any threat from the victim at the time of the assault.
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In denying Curry's request for a self-defense instruction, the district court
correctly concluded that the evidence presented at trial failed to show any
subjective fear on the part of Curry or that such fear would be objectively
reasonable. (Augmented Tr., p.20, L.6 - p.22, L.16.) Curry asserts the district
court was incorrect to require Curry to show subjective fear in order to utilize a
self-defense instruction and that such a requirement would place Curry in a
position that he may have to take the stand to testify on his behalf at trial.
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-21.) Curry relies on State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323,
989 P.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1999), for his position that the district court erred in
denying his request for a self-defense instruction because there is "no
requirement of a subjective fear on the part of the defendant." (Appellant's brief,
p.19.) The district court's conclusion that there were "no facts in this record by
which this jury could reasonable infer that Mr. Curry was in fear" (Augmented Tr.,
p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.1) is consistent with the holding in Hansen that:
it was not necessary that there be evidence that Hansen
reasonably feared great bodily harm in order to warrant a selfdefense instruction. Rather, evidence of a reasonable fear of some
level of bodily harm will suffice.
133 Idaho at 329, 986 P.2d at 352. Here, the testimony at trial showed Curry to
be the aggressor, with Mr. Escudero grabbing a pipe near the end of their
interaction to protect himself from what he felt was the threat of being shot by
Curry. Contrary to Curry's assertions, the district court correctly found the jury
was presented with no evidence that Curry was acting in a manner based on a
reasonable fear of bodily harm, "nor were there any facts by which a jury could
reasonable infer fear." (Augmented Tr., p.21, Ls.13-14.)
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Because Curry failed to establish any grounds for giving an instruction on
self-defense, he is not entitled to relief.

III.
Curry Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Motion For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Curry complains that the district court erred in denying his motion for a

new trial because, he contends, the verdict was contrary to the law and
evidence.

(Appellant's brief, p.7 (citing Tr., pp.75-76).)

Curry has failed to

establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new
trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's

discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley,
119 Idaho 62,63,803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Curry's Motion
For A New Trial
Curry filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal asserting "that the

evidence adduced by the State was insufficient to cause a reasonable juror to
find guilt beyond reasonable doubt." (R., p.208.) At a hearing on this motion, he
asked the court to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal or in the
alternative to order a new trial in the "interest of justice." (Tr., p.241, L.18 -
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p.245, L.7.)

On appeal, Curry asserts a new trial should have been ordered

because the trial court abused its discretion in presuming the jury would follow
the instructions limiting the scope of Ms. Ferra's testimony regarding her fear of
Curry and his access to a firearm. (Appellant's brief, p.21.)
In denying Curry's motion for a new trial, the district court discussed the
testimony of Ms. Ferra and concluded that the jury was properly instructed
that they could use [the] evidence [that Ms. Ferra was fearful of
Curry and that she had seen him with a gun] only for the limited
purpose of determining whether they believed the sworn testimony
at trial that she had never seen Mr. Curry with a gun.
(8/16/2010 Tr., p.253, Ls.13-19.) "[I]t is presumed that the jury follows a limiting

instruction." State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 175,911 P.2d 761,768 (Ct. App.
1995). See also State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, _ , 254 P.3d 47, 57 (Ct. App.
2011) ("We presume that the jury followed the district court's [limiting]
instructions.") There is nothing in the record to support Curry's claim that the jury
was unable to follow the court's instructions.
The district court correctly found, after reiterating its reasons for denying
Curry's motion for judgment of acquittal, that there was sufficient evidence to
support Curry's conviction and "the verdict [was] not contrary to law." (Tr., p.255,
L.3 - p.256, L.13.) Curry has failed to show error in the denial of his motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Curry's judgment.
DATED this 8th day of February 2012.
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